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On April 5, 2016, the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) released an Enforcement Plan and Guidance (the “Plan”) regarding the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (“FCPA”). The Plan contains three components designed to enhance the DOJ’s ability to detect and prosecute violations of the FCPA:  (1) a substantial increase in law enforcement resources; (2) increased coordination with foreign jurisdictions; and (3) implementation of a pilot program (the “Pilot Program”) offering substantial cooperation credit to companies that meet certain specified standards for “(1) voluntary self-disclosure of criminality, (2) full cooperation, and (3) remediation.”

One of the enumerated requirements for companies to achieve “full cooperation” (and thus earn maximum cooperation credit) under the Pilot Program is that companies must effectuate “[d]islcosure of overseas documents, the location in which such documents were found, and who found the documents.” This requirement comes with an exception for situations in which “such disclosure is impossible due to foreign law, including but not limited to foreign data privacy laws.”  The requirement and exception are followed by a note stating that:

Where a company claims that disclosure is prohibited, the burden is on the company to establish the prohibition. Moreover, a company should work diligently to identify all available legal bases to provide such documents.

Thus, companies seeking to avail themselves of the cooperation credit offered under the Pilot Program may find themselves trying to strike a delicate balance between compliance with foreign data privacy laws, such as those in the European Union that restrict the transfer of personal data, and compliance with the DOJ’s “full cooperation” requirement.
Continue Reading The Intersection of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and Data Privacy

In a February 19th speech at the annual SEC Speaks conference, Stephanie Avakian, Deputy Director of the SEC’s Division of Enforcement, explained what the SEC expects of entities that experience a cyber intrusion and how the SEC decides whether to investigate such entities.

With respect to responding to cyber intrusion, the SEC’s stated expectations are high level and axiomatic. Entities are expected to (1) assess the situation, (2) address the problem and (3) minimize the damage. Ms. Avakian emphasized the importance of quickly involving authorities such as the FBI or Department of Homeland Security.

Ms. Avakian also expressed awareness of the practical impediments to self-reporting cyber intrusions to the SEC. Specifically, entities may be hesitant to do so for fear of triggering an investigation and enforcement action regarding their policies/procedures and implementation thereof. To assuage this concern, Ms. Avakian noted that the SEC’s goals in the cybersecurity area are to prevent hacking, protect customer data and ensure the smooth operation of America’s financial system. In other words, the SEC—at least from a priority standpoint—is on the same side as the entities that may fall prey to a cyber intrusion. In the case of registrants, when investigating cyber intrusions the SEC will focus on whether a registrant had policies and procedures reasonably designed to protect customer data and related remediation action plans. In the case of public companies, the SEC is not looking to second-guess good-faith decisions regarding data privacy, and would likely not bring an enforcement action against a cyber intrusion victim absent a “significant” disclosure issue. Ms. Avakian also pointed out that entities who self-disclose cyber intrusions will be rewarded with cooperation credit.  
Continue Reading SEC Speaks: How the SEC Decides Whether to Investigate Breached Entities