Class Action

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Faced with waves of consumer lawsuits targeting common website tools like browser cookies, tracking pixels, and live chat features, businesses are often frustrated by the outsized exposure posed by seemingly “no-injury” claims. (See, for example, last week’s post about CIPA claims.) The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals recently provided some comfort by clarifying what a plaintiff must allege to show “concrete injury” as required for Article III standing. The court’s decision in Popa v. Microsoft Corp., No. 24-14, 2025 WL 2448824 (9th Cir. Aug. 26, 2025), strengthens defenses to online privacy claims—with broad application to other types of consumer claims as well—holding that standing requires more than just an alleged statutory violation.Continue Reading Popa v. Microsoft Corporation, et al.: Ninth Circuit Clarifies Article III Standing Requirements and Strengthens Defenses to Internet Privacy and Other Consumer Claims

Phone and gavelThe volume of TCPA cases nationwide makes it incredibly difficult to keep up with all of the latest developments. Who wants to engage in the tedious task of reading more than 100 published decisions related to the TCPA several times a year? Lucky for you, the answer is us! We have once again taken on the burden of slogging through the swampy flood of TCPA cases nationwide, so you don’t have to. We have compiled the most noteworthy decisions since our last report, and they are listed below by issue category in alphabetical order.
Continue Reading TCPA Case Law Review (Vol. 9): How are there still this many TCPA cases?

GavelOn April 24, 2019, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an important decision touching a number of hot button issues and litigation threats facing American businesses — including class actions, arbitration agreements and data privacy.

The case, Lamps Plus, Inc. v. Varela, 17-988, 2019 WL 1780275 (U.S. Apr. 24, 2019), stemmed from a data breach in which a hacker posing as a company official “tricked” a Lamps Plus employee into disclosing the tax information of approximately 1,300 workers.  Among those 1,300 workers was Frank Varela, the named plaintiff.  Id. at *2.  Following the data breach, Mr. Varela became the victim of identity theft when a fraudulent federal income tax return was filed in his name. 
Continue Reading SCOTUS Catapults Class Arbitration Onto the Endangered Species List

Clients regularly ask: If we win this putative class action, can the opposition just file another one on behalf of another as-yet-unidentified putative class representative?  Until June 11, the answer was “Maybe?”  Now, the answer is clearly no.

In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court (in reversing the Ninth Circuit) clarified…

In the past few weeks, five putative class action lawsuits have been filed under the Illinois Biometric Information Privacy Act (“BIPA”), 740 ILCS 14/1 et seq., targeting defendants in the health care, senior living, commercial baking, meat processing and security industries. These recent suits join previously filed BIPA class actions against day care operators, tanning salons, video game manufacturers, hotel groups and supermarkets as well as much larger entities, including Facebook, Google, Shutterfly, Six Flags and Snapchat. All of these suits have similar allegations at their core; that defendants utilized employees’, customers’, or other persons’ biometric identifiers, such as fingerprints, voiceprints, retina scans or facial recognition technology, in violation of BIPA’s disclosure and consent requirements. All seek recovery of BIPA’s statutory liquidated damages of $1,000 for each negligent violation, or $5,000 for each intentional or reckless violation, injunctive relief, and recovery of attorneys’ fees and costs.

BIPA Background

Until the past 18 months, when the first of these suits was filed, BIPA has been a little-known statute. Enacted in 2008, BIPA was passed to protect against risk of identity theft resulting from the growing use of biometric technology to facilitate financial transactions and security screenings. 740 ILCS 14/5.

BIPA applies to both biometric identifiers, such as fingerprints, voiceprints, retina scans, and facial geometry, and other biometric information based on those identifiers to the extent used to identify an individual. 740 ILCS 14/10. BIPA is an important measure because, unlike such things as Social Security numbers and passwords that can be changed if necessary, biometrics are biologically unique and, when compromised, leave an individual without recourse. 740 ILCS 14/5.
Continue Reading The Rise of Biometric Lawsuits in Illinois

On July 10, 2017, the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (the “CFPB”) finalized its proposed arbitration rule that will prohibit providers of certain consumer financial products and services from requiring a consumer to utilize mandatory pre-dispute arbitration in lieu of a consumer filing or participating in a class action (“Arbitration Rule”). In other words, no longer may covered entities require a consumer to use arbitration in lieu of class action participation. This Arbitration Rule will likely have far ranging consequences for covered providers, including mandatory updates to consumer agreements, likely increases to legal and compliance costs and increased operational risks in new consumer products.

Background

Congress directed the CFPB to study pre-dispute arbitration agreements in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“the Dodd-Frank Act”).  The Dodd-Frank Act also authorized the CFPB, after completing the study, to issue regulations restricting or prohibiting the use of arbitration agreements if the CFPB found that such rules would be in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.  In 2015, the CFPB published and delivered to Congress a study of arbitration.  On May 24, 2016, the CFPB proposed the Arbitration Rule with a request for comment.  Since May 2016 the CFPB has been silent, leading many in the financial services industry to believe that, with the change in administration, the CFPB had abandoned the Arbitration Rule.  In finalizing the Arbitration Rule, the CFPB has answered the industry’s long outstanding question.  Would the CFPB be more moderate in its approach in issuing regulation that drastically impacts financial services providers?  The industry has its answer.  The CFPB has answered in the negative.
Continue Reading Another Day, Another Regulation: A Summary and Description of the CFPB’s Arbitration Rule

If you follow developments in TCPA case law, you’ve probably heard by now that the DC Circuit Court of Appeals last week overturned the 2015 FCC Order that had required TCPA opt-out notices on both solicited and unsolicited faxes. The court held that the FCC’s rule was “unlawful to the extent that it requires opt-out notices on solicited faxes.” See Bais Yaakov of Spring Valley v. FCC, et al., Case No. 14-1234 (D.C. Cir.). In fact, the DC Circuit—despite years of FCC guidance, 13 consolidated appeals and more than two dozen lawyers participating in the briefing—seemed to view this as a relatively simple issue of statutory construction: “The text of the Act provides a clear answer to the question presented in this case. . . . Congress drew a line in the text of the statute between unsolicited fax advertisements and solicited fax advertisements. Unsolicited fax advertisements must include an opt-out notice. But the Act does not require (or give the FCC authority to require) opt-out notices on solicited fax advertisements. It is the Judiciary’s job to respect the line drawn by Congress, not to redraw it as we might think best.”
Continue Reading DC Circuit Opts Out of Flawed FCC Ruling

Yet another court has found that consent in a TCPA case is an inherently individualized issue that precludes class certification. In Newhart v. Quicken Loans, Inc., 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 168721 (S.D. Fla. Oct. 13, 2016), the plaintiff moved to certify a class of individuals who had received calls from defendant on their cellular telephones, allegedly in violation of the TCPA. The court denied class certification, finding that “resolving the consent issue will depend upon multiple layers of individualized evidence about each call and the circumstances that preceded it. Therefore, predominance is lacking.” Id. at *6. Importantly, the court did not need to decide “whether any class member actually consented.” Id.

The court held that the consent analysis had two parts. First, the trier of fact must determine “whether each challenged call was made for a telemarketing purpose.” Id. If so, prior express written consent would be required. If not, the consent need not be in writing. Id. Second, the trier of fact must determine whether the defendant “possessed the requisite consent before making each call.” Id. at *6–7.  The court’s decision that an individualized analysis was necessary turned largely on its finding that the trier of fact must look at each individual call, not the “purpose of the overall campaign. Id. at *7–8. Analogizing to the TCPA fax provision, the court noted that, “[t]he FCC has expressly recognized, in the unsolicited fax context, that even when some aspect of a series of communications might meet the telemarketing rule, others might not, and so it is necessary to examine the communications separately.” Id. at *8. Because evidence showed that the challenged calls in the case were not uniform in purpose, the telemarketing issue could not be resolved on a class-wide basis. Id. at *10. 
Continue Reading TCPA Class Certification Denials Continue to Pile Up, This Time in Florida

I. Overview

While the New Jersey Truth-in-Consumer Contract, Warranty and Notice Act (the TCCWNA) has been around for over 30 years, there has been a recent surge in the filing of class action lawsuits under the statute against businesses engaged in e-commerce. The statute was enacted in 1981 to regulate “consumer contracts, warranties, notices and signs contain[ing] provisions which clearly violate the rights of consumers.” Although such provisions are legally unenforceable, the legislature reasoned that “their very inclusion in a contract, warranty, notice or sign deceives a consumer into thinking that they are enforceable and for this reason the consumer often fails to enforce his rights.”

Initially, the statute was not used very much and remained dormant during the first 30 years following its enactment. Recently, however, the plaintiffs’ bar has resurrected the statute, targeting the website terms and conditions of businesses engaged in e-commerce. This resurrection began in 2013 as a result of the New Jersey Supreme Court holding that certificates issued by restaurants and offered for purchase by an Internet marketer are subject to TCCWNA rules1, and it has continued for a few reasons. First, plaintiffs are asserting that the TCCWNA is very broad in scope. Indeed, plaintiffs’ lawyers contend that it applies to consumers who suffered no actual injury. Additionally, the statute provides for statutory damages of $100 per customer as well as attorney’s fees and costs, which creates the potential for very large monetary awards. Finally, while more guidance is necessary to determine how courts will treat e-commerce TCCWNA claims, there have been several plaintiff-friendly TCCWNA decisions in New Jersey.
Continue Reading New Jersey Consumer Statute Presents Trap for Unwary Retailers Engaged in E-Commerce

Despite claims from the plaintiffs’ bar that the Supreme Court’s decision in Spokeo Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540 (2016), did not significantly change the landscape for class actions, courts continue to rely on Spokeo to dismiss claims that have no concrete injury beyond a statutory violation. In the last month, two more cases — including one federal circuit-level decision and one TCPA decision — were dismissed because the plaintiff was unable to demonstrate Article III standing under Spokeo. These cases demonstrate the important role that Spokeo-related arguments can play in stymying class actions.

In Nicklaw v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 18206 (11th Cir. Oct. 6, 2016), the court held that the plaintiff lacked Article III standing to pursue a claim where the class action complaint alleged statutory violations and sought only statutory damages.  The only claim asserted by the plaintiff in Nicklaw was that the plaintiff failed to comply with a New York statute requiring it to sign and record a certificate of discharge within 30 days of a mortgage satisfaction. Based on the defendant’s alleged failure to do so,  the plaintiff sought monetary damages. The court held that plaintiff alleged “neither a harm nor a material risk of harm that the district court could remedy.” This opinion marked the first time that the Eleventh Circuit had applied the Spokeo framework and will undoubtedly have a ripple effect on district court cases within the circuit (and beyond) when defendants make similar arguments. Although Nicklaw is not a media or privacy case, it certainly provides a roadmap for all manner of class actions.
Continue Reading Spokeo as a Class-Action Silver Bullet? Two More Dismissals Based on Lack of Concrete Harm